A Framework for Evaluating Consumer Information Regulation
With the emerging interest in consumer protection, government agencies have enacted a variety of regulations affecting marketplace information.
For example, the Treasury Department until very recently restricted compar ative alcoholic beverage advertising (BATF 1976) , the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) now requires manufacturers to disclose nutrition in formation on food packages (FDA 1973) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has attempted to eliminate restrictions on eyeglasses' advertising (FTC 1979) .
Given the variety of approaches used, a coherent structure is needed to eval uate any regulation which directly affects the amount and scope of the market place information (i.e., a "consumer information remedy"). This article provides such a framework for assessing alternative regulatory approaches.
The approach taken is to integrate the theories of three diverse disciplines; economics, consumer behavior and law. Although each area has much to say about specific aspects of consumer protection regulation, a wider perspective is needed to develop a comprehensive framework . Economic theory normally addresses the reactions of sellers to changes in the market consumers' place while consumer behavior theories are most concerned with reactions to market changes. Both reactions must be forecasted if the benefits and costs of any regulatory action are to be predicted. Finally, it is important to understand the views of the judiciary, since legal thought has a great influence on the interpretation of and/or restrictions placed on any rule or regulation.
The overarching principle of this article is the assessment and compar ison of costs and benefits. As a result, it discusses first, the questionwhen is government intervention appropriate?--by using findings from both economics and consumer behavior to classify relevant costs and benefits. These three proposi tions then are cons idered j ointly to suggest an analytic framework for classifying information reme di e s along a " Remedies Continuum , " from the leas t to the mo s t res t rictive of marke t forces. At one end of the Continuum are those remedies which remove barriers and permit the free flow of information.
In the mid-range a re remedies which involve more active government intervent ion aimed at enhancing information flow;
remedies such as requiring a specified time period after "purchase " to enable the consumer to search for additional information ("cooling off" laws) and requiring manufacturers to disclose spec ifi c information. Fin ally, at the other end of the Continuum are those remedi e s which limit or prohibi t dissemination of marke tplace information, such as banning cigarette broadcast advertising. Thi s paper takes the po si tion that government should turn first to les s restric tive remedies since they are likely to be leas t disruptive and impose fewer costs then more restrictive approaches.
By drawing on varied dis cipline s , thi s paper a) provides a comprehen sive view of consumer protect ion regulat ion and b) develops a framework for evaluating c onsumer informa tion regulation which can serve as a useful management tool . Persons currently involved in one aspect of the prob lem (e. g . , consumer researchers working in the pub l ic poli cy area or managers affected by c onsumer protec tion regulation) should find the discussion of intere s t s ince it provides a) broa d exposure to que s tions that mu s t be answe red before a particular remedy can be adequately eva luated and b) the conceptual framework ne cessary for conduc ting such an analysi s .
Sin e the focus o f the article i s t o develop princ iples which can be applied to the total range of consumer pro tection information re gulation, the argumen ts put forth are by necessity general in nature. Thus, there are few pragmatic prescriptions app li cable to specific market ing appli ca tions: Also, s ince thi s article centers on information remedies which di rec tly affect the quanti ty and varie ty of marketplace information, the analysis exc ludes government efforts whi ch affe c t informat ion indirec tly, such as anti-trust enforcement, or remedies which address substantive or pro cedural r ights for c onsumers, such as refund provision . Also exc luded are consumer education efforts,.and voluntary information and standard setting proc edure s. Although these approaches are us eful substitutes for information remedies, they are beyond the scope of this artic le.
( See Breyer 1979·, for a broad overview of regulatory alternatives . ) For an extended discuss ion of the concepts discussed in thi s ar ticle, see " Consumer Information Remedies," ( FTC 1979) .
When is Government Intervention Appropriate?
Tradit ional micro-economic theory posits that both buyers and sellers are endowed with pe rfect information; the buyer to discriminate perfe ctly between all offerings and the seller to judge perfectly the consume rs' ne eds . Based on thi s information flow, it follows that consumer $overeignty will efficiently govern the allocation of resources in the economy through marketplace transactions. That is, consumers' informed marketplace choices transn?-t signals to sellers regarding the valuation of products, and sellers respond by varying production based on the relative value consumers place on competing alternatives. Th:ts situation where buyer and seller are not restricted in their actions is often referred to as the £ree market solution. AssUming rfect _information, these conditions lead to-the .
optimal allocation of scar ce resources.
Since this marketplace economy is based on the accurate transmission of signals between buyers and sellers, some government intervention !!!!l. be appropriate when there exists any informational market failure, i.e., when consumer decisions (signals) are based on false or limited information.
This intervention can involve any one of a series of remedies aimed at curing the market failure. The major criteria for selecting among remedies is the relevant benefits and costs associated with each solution. In this · section, the major benefits of "curing" a market failure are discussed.
Later, cost issues are explored.
In order to determine the benefits of any remedy designed to increase consumer welfare associated with curing an information market failure, three broad ben efit categories should be considered: a) enhancing infor mation so that consumers can improve.their choice among available offer ings; b) improving the quality of the available o fferings; and c) lower ing the general price levels of these offerings.
The first benefit--better consumer choice--at one is almost self-evident since consumers armed with more complete informa tion should be able to make better decisions than when choice is based on level of analysis limited knowledge about product attributes. The deter mination of the value of more complete information, however, is a controversial issue. Bettman (1975)1 for one, raises the question of whether information has value by itself or whether it needs to change behavior to have any value. In a way, both views are correct. Using a decision theoretic approach it is possible to show that information has some value if a) it has the potential of mod ifying consumer actions and b) the resulting actions lead to a better out come. The latter aspect has been questioned by Jacoby et al. (1974) who showed instances where too much information led to a poorer decision . .!/
The first condition implies information need not change everyone's behavior, only have a probability of modifying behavior. In this way, information can be said to have value by itself. However, for information to have any sub stantial benefit to society, it either has to result in a significant saving to a set o onsumers or have a significant probability of modifying be havior. C onsequently, in an aggregate sense, information must result in some behavior change for it to have any value.
The second benefit--improved product quality--occurs whenever new information allows some consumers to alter their choice, thus providing a signal to the sellers to change their product. For example, when the FTC required cigarette manufacturers to provide the level of tar and nicotine in cigarettes, some consumers who sought "safer" cigarettes switched their consumption to lower tar and nicotine products. Consequently, sellers now provide a much wider range of cigarette products. This increased selection benefits all consumers, even those who didn't use the original information.
1/ -Their analyses of these data has been-questioned by a number of other researchers (Russo 1974; Staelin and Payne 1976; Summers 1975; Wilkie 1974) .
The third benefit--reduced prices--o ccurs whenever the new information reduces the s el ler's " informational marke t power. " It is often assumed that th presence of a large numbe r of sellers wi ll cause the price level to fa ll to the perfectly competi tive price. However, thi s is not necessar i ly the case. For example, assume tha t a consumer is searching for the lowest rice for a parti cular brand of toaster. The consumer visits one s tore and finds tha t the price for that brand of toaster is a bi t higher than he or she suspec ted. However, the only way that the consumer can determine the lowest price is to visit or to phone o ther stores. I f the price premium is pe rceived to be reasonable, a consumer may be willing to pay a lit tle extra rather than incur the extra search costs. Thus, the first store is able to extract a small premium--i. e. , it has a small degree of market power.
More genera l ly, if consumers are imperfectly informed, even small sellers may achieve informa tion market power. Thus, the FTC (1975a) c la imed that a lthough there are over 20,000 funeral sel lers, each sma ll funeral home may be in a position to achieve a degree of informational market power over i t s customers. This is be caus e consumers do not typically com parison shop fo r funera l services or purchase these services frequently. As a result, there is exce ss capacity at many funera l homes and the FTC be lieves indus try pr ice s are above .the per fe c t ly competi tive price. Another condition associated with the nee d for an information remedy is the lack of incentive for any sel ler to pr ovide relevant information.
This occurs whenever a) consume rs cannot determine the presenc e of the de sired attribute even after product use or b) the information would act as a deterrent to product class s ales. Thus , cigarette manufacturers had no incentive to po st health warnings on their products, nor do food manu fa cture rs find it in their interest to list the level of "natural" contami nation (e. g. , ins ect parts and rodent hairs) found in mo st foods even though con sumers indicate tha t they want such information.
A third situation for which there may be significant benefits associated with government intervention is the existence of substan tial "external"
benefit? of information a vailability which are not fully accounted for in individual decisions. In this sense, information is similar to traditional "public goods" ,such as national defe nse or lighthouses, whe r the private demand for such facilities is normall y insufficient, since the benefits of suca facilities accrue to everyone.
Similarly, although information may provide some benefit to the consumer who gathers it, the positive effects of increased information on the competitive process may also have substantial benefits to consumers who do not seek or use the information ( Salop 1978).
In other words, from a societal point of view, the private search decisions of individuals may lead to an underprovision of marketplace information. In this respect the free market solution would not be optimal.
It should be noted that only a significant minority of consumers need to gather and use information in their purchase decisions to cause the desired response from sellers.21 For example, label reading for food ingred ients and nutrition by a minority of consumers has led to significant product modification in the case of baby foods ( removing salt and artificial ingredi ents) and of ready-to-eat breakfast cereals ( vitamin fortification ) . ·Thus , government information disclosures designed to improve the efficiency of a consumers because of subset of individual purchase decisions may benefit all the resulting stimulus to competition.
Costs of Information Remedies
The above discussion has be en concerned with the possible benefits of £/Another way of saying this is that not all consumers have to use informa tion for it to accrue value to all consumers, i.e., information-can have value other than helping the consumer make a better choice. complying enforcing 9 governmental intervention and establishing circumstances when these benefits tend to be greatest. In this section, the generic costs of information remedies are briefly described. Later in the article , the benefit-cost paradigm is applied to a variety of regulatory alternatives.
There are three major categories of costs which should be assessed when evaluating information remedies:
(1) the affected firms' costs of costs of the with the remedy; remedy; and (2) the.government's (3) the costs to buyers and sellers of any unintended side effects.
The compliance and enforcement costs, although often significant, are usually easier to identify than those which fall under unintended side effects.
The compliance costs for a remedy using labeling disclosures in clude not only the printing costs but also the possible loss of flexibility of being unable to make minor product modifications without discarding the la bels. For instance, food manufacturers may find it difficult to substitute similar ingredients or to slightly modify a recipe since current food regula tions require the listing of all ingredients in the order of predominance.
Another example is the record keeping and testing costs associated with sub stantiating advertising claims.
Enforcement costs must also be considered in remedy evaluation. For instance, although government monitoring of salespersons could greatly reduce the amount of arketplace deception, exorbitant enforcement costs make the remedy impractical. In another example, t e U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) uses the costly method of requiring prior approval of each label change for products under their jurisdiction, while the FDA chooses a more selective approach, thereby reducing its enforcement burdens.
The last category of costs, unintended side effects, is normally the most difficult to quantify prior to enacting a regulation. However, care ful analysis of buyer and seller reactions to the information remedy will often permit accurate prediction of these costs. For instance, if the costs associated with message development are increased by regulation, a seller will tend to avoid dissemination of this type of message. Thus, if comparison advertisements are required to disclose more detailed informa tion than single product ads (e.g., requiring information for both adver tised and compared brands (FTC 1974)), it. is probable that the number of comparative advertisements will be reduced since they are more heavily burdened. Since many consumer advocates view comparative ads as providing better information, the disclosure requirements in this example could be viewed as having deleterious side effects.
The "cooling off" laws provide another example of possible unintended side effects. These rules require the seller to wait a period of time before consumm ating the sale, thereby allowing the buyer to seek more information and /or to re-evaluate his or her decision after the pressures of the salesperson are removed. However, some sales-oriented firms have begun to use the rule as a sales "gimmick" claiming that the consumer should sign up for the service or product now since they can cancel the sale at a later date. The firm assumes that most consumers will not follow through with the cancellation. Consequently, the "cooling off" laws may actually "hook" a segment of the public onto the product or service that they would have normally resisted purchasing prior to the regulation. Al though this effect may not be injurious to consumers, it was not the purpose of the law. Although it is useful to exhort government agencies to more carefully evalua e proposed regulations, a set of general principles is needed to guide development of information remedies which maximize the benefit-cost ratio.
In the next se ction, three such principles are presented:
( 1) incentive compatibility, (2) communi cation effectiveness, and (3) First Amendment protections, these principles derived from economic, consumer ' behavior, and legal theory, respectively.
Incentive
An "incentive compatible" remedy is one which is compatible with sellers' incentives and consequently produces the desired results with minimal com pliance and enforcement costs.
In a sense, all government regulations ultimately rely on market in centives, such as the desire to avoid costly litigation and the fines . The concept of incentive compatible remedies goes beyond typical "connn and-and-control" approach, however, by harnessing positive marketplace for ces rather than using negative incentives that require costly enforcement efforts and impose heavy compliance burdens to l / achieve the desired effect.
One example of an incentive compatible approach is the effort by the Justice Department and FTC to eliminate various professional advertising restrictions, such as for attorneys, veterinarians, dentists, physicians professionals to advertise. and accountants.
These actions do not Instead, the benefits to sellers from such advertising is expected to induce a greater flow of useful market information, which in turn, allows consumers to make better decisions, spurring competition among sellers.
1 1 Incentive compatible remedies are somewhat analogous to reward authority in the channel management literature (S tern 1969). Thus, the regulatory agency can modify the seller's behavior (i.e. , use its authority) without markedly increasing the conflict between itself and the seller.
The se ac tions have led to the es tablis hment of " department s to re" dent istry which relies on advertising to attract cus tomers. Often these consumers are new in that they do no t have a regular denti s t.
They are at tracted to the service because they find it more conveni en t and lower priced than prior availab le dental services.
A second examp le of an incentive compatib le remedy is the e stab l i sh ment of a s tandard, such as mi les-pe r-gallon ratings for automob iles and tar and nicotine measures for cigare t tes. These measure s have been used by firms in promoting particular b rands , thereby furthering compe tition along crit ical product dimensions . /
There is good reason fo r des igning incentive compat ible remedies , since they do no t require government agencies to ascertain consumer infor mation needs nor do they require monitoring of the exact consumer response to info rmation or charting consumer information needs over time .
Ins tead, the se tasks are le ft to the se llers who are better equipped to interpret consumer needs. Moreover , they have an economic incentive to accompli sh these tasks efficien tly.
The above logic also implies that approaches whi ch permit market forces to determine the exact form of information provision are likely to be more "incentive compatib le" than alternative remedi es which res trict marketplace practices or offerings. Consequently , as a first approach to an information problem, regulators should consider regulations which rely on consumer s overeignty and seller incentives to achieve their goals rather than trying to spec ify with precision how the marketplace should operate.
/ It should be noted that the FTC banned cigarette manufac turers from us ing c laims of tar and nicotine content from 1957 to 1966. By fina l ly e s tab lishing one particular measure for these at tributes, the FTC provided an " incentive " for sellers to increase the qual ity of their products along these dimens ions since they are now a llowed to advertise their brand on these attributes. necessary to accomplish the remedial objective." The "confessional preamble,"
"contrary to prior advertising," ordered by FTC for Listerine was struck as being unnecessary to accomplish the objective of correcting false beliefs. 
Information Remedies Continuum
Thus far general classes of costs and benefits for any information remedy have been delineated.
In this section a frameworkiS presented for categorizing any information remedy which directly impinges on or shapes the content of the commercial information received by consumers. Underlying this framework is the assumption that there exists a continuum of approaches and that less restrictive remedies should be considered before turning to more restrictive ones.
Both legal and economic theory favors the least restrictive alternative necessary to achieve legitimate regulatory goals. First Amendment cases support the proposition that remedies should keep the flow of commercial information as "clean" as possible without unduly restricting total informa tion flow. In addition, economic theory points out that competitive forces if allowed to operate unfettered will produce the optimal quantity and variety of goods at optimal prices. This implies that even in situations where government intervention is necessary, the market should be allowed to function as freely as possible, i.e., information remedies should go only far enough to restore competitive forces. 
3)
information flow by banning product claims.
These three categories of remedies are discussed through a series of examples.
For each example, the previously developed framework is used to set forth benefits and costs.
Restraints on Information
There are numerous situations where spontaneous flow of commercial information is being held back by public or private advertising constraints.
In these cases, it is often possible to eliminate the restraints and let consumers benefit from the additional commercial data that results from natural market forces. For example, there has been a concerted effort to remove the barriers against the dissemination of advertising for professional services and products and for comparative advertising.
Benefits of
Restraints. The benefits of eliminating barriers against advertising include reducing search costs, lowering prices, encour aging new entrants and accommodating underserved groups. Reduced search costs were of major concern in the Supreme Court's decision ( 1976), which states "those whom the suppression of prescription drug price information hits the hardest are the poor, the sick, and partic ularly the aged." These consumers may not be in a position physically to go from store to store to determine the best price for a specific drug.
Increased advertising should help r educe search costs and also result in lover prices. This vas found to be the case for eyeglass adv rtising where comparison studies shoved prices were substantially higher (by 25% to 4o%)
in states which banned advertising than in jurisdictions which had no (Benham and Benham 1975) . Advertising by new entrants not only enhances competition, it can also facilitate the expansion of services to previously underserved groups.
Ghetto residents who have become accustomed to resorting to hospital emergency rooms for day-to-day medical problems, for instance, could benefit from learning through advertising about young doctbrs, who, because of the increased supply of physicians, may attempt to establish pr actic es in urban areas. Likewise, new legal and dental services which rely on advertising to attract consumers who did not extensively use the existing (and normally higher priced) services have sprung up in recent years. Finally , i t should be recognized that there may be inst ances in which the mere l i fting of formal restrictions will not result in enhancing information flow. The of ficia l b an on advertising by funeral directors studies dete rmined that personal influence within the commu nity of service providers hindered the flow of information wi th those engaging in price advertising being subject to peer pressure and ostracism ( FTC 1978c ). An analogous situation may exist for discount real estate b rokers. This sort of pressure is most likely to o ccur in industries where there is a need for cooperation (e. g. , a multi list f or rea l estate brokers) , although it can also occur in industries where there exists a strong p rofessional ident ity. It is no t clear that a satisfactory barrier removing remedy can be devised to circumvent this occurrence.
Flow
The next general category on the remedy continuum deals with rul es aimed at directly enhancing informa t ion flow. Within this category are minimal intervention strategies such as permitting greater consumer search through "cooling o f f " provisions and "untying" two logi ca l ly separab le services (e. g. , requiring eyeglass prescriptions to be given to consumers to facilitate purchase from alternative providers). Also included in this category are the strategies of estab lishing standard def ini tions before certain selling claims can be made ( e.g. , for a "natural" or " low calorie" food) and developing standards f or measuring p roduct quality (e. g. , measure ments of est imated automob ile gasoline mileage).
Su ch standards can be used volunta rily by a se ller or disclosure may be required by a government agency .
Required disclosures involve the greater degree of government involvement
Pe itting
Experience .
and marketplace restrictions since dissemination is manda ted regardless of compe titive forces . Each of these remedies is discussed below .
20.
Greater Consumer Search and One method of increasing informat ion f low without "heavy handed " government intervention is enhancement of consumers ' opportuni ty to engage in info tion gathering consistent with their needs . The government t akes no direct role in determ ining the exact f orm of the informati on , but does guarantee that the con sumer has t ime t o conduct a search . In this way , consumers have consider ab le freedom to select info r mat ion they perceive to have greater value than the associated search costs.
" Coo ling off" laws are a good examp le of a search remedy , since a time period is se t aside ( typica l ly three days) for consumers to consider informat ion stored in memory or to consult friend s or other unbiased sour ces. Whi le "coo ling off" periods are potentially quite usefu l , there are connn unication effectiveness quest ions which may af fect the remedy ' s success in curing fundamental marketplace prob lems since consumers may not understand their righ t to cance l the sa les agreement . Also , as mentioned earlier , consumers may be impeded from cance l lation by psychological ( e . g . , cognit ive di ssonance ) or socia l f actors which could lead to unin tended side effects .
When consi derab le product experience , rather than mere informa tion gathering , is needed for consumers to guage a product ' s utility , more restrictive remedies may be appropriate. For examp l e , the usefulness o f a hearing ai d i s frequently di fficult to ascertain prior to receipt and trial. Under these circumstances the FTC has argued that direct observa tion of product performance and re fund provision is necessary for consumers to make informed judg ments about prices and quality (FTC 1975b which would allow consumers to cancel contracts after the facilities are built, could affect the ability of small firms to raise the necessary fun ds to build a facility since signed contracts are useful in securing financing. These costs must be balanced against the benefits of possible allegedly unscrupulous sellers.
In cases where delivery of con sumer services requires considerable expertise, diagnosis of the problem often precedes repair. In some situations these two aspects can be un coupled. For example, a physician diagnoses a medical problem and recommends treatment in the form of a written prescription for a drug.
The patient is then free to shop among competing pharmacists to have it filled. This should be contrasted to situations where the diagnostician recommends and then provides the treatment. In this latter case, the potentially netural diagnostician has an economic incentive to recommend unnecessary or expensive treatment since he or she profits from this sale.
possible A viable remedy is to make it for consumers to obtain a diagnosis separate from treatment, when this can be done at little cost.
Thus, the Eyeglass Rule (FTC 1978a) gives patients the right to have the diagnosis (prescription) written out, so that they can shop elsewhere for treatment (getting the glasses made and fitted). A similar approach may be possible for dentures. A recent Oregon statute limits the diagnosis of_any gum disease to dentists but permits dentures to be fit by either dentists or· denturists (Journal of American Dental Association 1978).
Similar remedies might involve giving consumers the right to auto repair work sheets, medical records, X-rays, and other documents which are normally prepared by the diagnostician anyway and thus can be given to the consumer at little cost. This remedy has the advantage that, if sepa rating diagnosis from treatment is not efficient, few consumers will attempt to do so, so the remedy would not force the market into a less efficient alternative. There are, of course, communication issues involved since consumers must be apprised of their rights to obtain such information and must be able to interpret the documents provided.
Although the benefits of decoupling can be significant, there are often large costs associated with separating diagnosis from treatment. action to prohibit claims which do not meet the standard . However , i t is a rela tively non-restrictive remedy provided the standard is set properly.
S tandardizing the definition of "natural , " as proposed in the FI'C's Food Advertising Rule ( FTC 1974) , would be less restrictive than requiring . 6 / disclosure o f the definit ion or a ban on " natural" claims .-Assuming that the definition i s reasonab l e , those sellers who se food qualifies as "natllral" (no artif icial ingredients and minimal processing) will be able to make the claim without having to counter other "natur ln claims which use a dif ferent standard . This approach can be contrasted with the remedy of requiring seller s to disclose additional information if they mentioned the standard ( i . e . , anyone could claim "natural" as long as they disclosed all types of artif icial ingredients and amount of processing) . This dis closure would place an extra burden on advertisers selling "non na tural" products who wanted to us e the term. A more restrictive approach would be to ban the word " natural. " While this would eliminate d eceptive and con fusing usage of the term, it would be more res trictive of speech than simply standardizing the def ini tion .
A second method o f set t ing standards i s to provide a single obj ective me tric for a product attribute which all firms can use . This standard lowers the co s t of communicating and o f ten creates or improves the market for the at tribut e . For examp l e , while i t has always b een easy to communi cate the price of insulation , the quality for this product class is diffi cul t for consumers to ob serve and for sel lers to describe credib ly without some standard . By developing the R-value metric , the FTC may have lowered the communication cos t and facilitated the market for this attribute .
! / The Food Advertising Ru le ( Phase I) actually p roposes to require the dis closure of the de finition of "natural" each time it is u se d . For the pur pose of this example , however , it is assumed that the de fini t ion is simply standardized . It may be dif ficult to determine in advance whe ther there will be a demand f or the information provided by a new standard. As marketers have found wi th the introduc tion of new products--even with the best po ssib l e ma rke t research, the chances of failure a r e high. There fore, once a standard has been given a full and fair trial, and it produces only minimal market response because there is lit t le market demand for either th e information or the at tribute measures, then t erminat ion of the standard should be considered.
Whi le standards offer a number of impor tant c onsume r benef it s, there are some impor tant costs. A standa rd which sets up a measuring system for a characteristic implicitly define s an "ideal" produc t--one which achieves the highest possible score on a ll dimensions of the measurement. Consider -7 / The slow process o f education and acculturation may eventua lly create a market for newly measurable charac teristi cs. However, i t is also possible that there exi sts another standard or method of measurement which wou ld better convey the information to the consumer and cause the consume rs to alte r their behavior. Across-the-board dis c losures are particu lar ly approp riate when infer mation concerns an entire product clas s . Of ten this information concerns negative aspects ( e . g . , warnings of product hazards) which are generic to the product cla s s and thus no incentive exi s t s for any f irm to provide this information . For example , the health e ffects o f cigarette smoking and s ide ef fec ts of consuming over-the-counter drug s i s information which the market is unlikely to provi de unles s there are c lo se sub st itutes wi thdut the drawb cks ( e . g . , aspirin vs . acetaminophen). It is unlike ly , a lso , that many door-to-door sales firms ( e . g . , for en cyc lopedias) which do no t re ly on repeat bus iness , would find i t in their interest to notify po ten t ial cus tomers that they are p lanning to solicit busine s s ( Encyclopedia Britannica 19 76) . / While disc losure would appear to be less res tric tive than s imply pro hib i t ing misl eading claims , in some instances , dis c losures may actually reduce the overall amount of information available to consumers . In disclosures increase the cost o f communi cation . Th ese cos ts ine lude the direct compliance costs of delivering the message as we l l as the / The FTC ordered Encyc lopedia Britanni ca sales representatives to show at the outset of their s ales presentation a 3" x 5" card which s tates , "The purpose of this representative ' s call i s to solicit the sale of encyclopedias . "
as so ciated with the adver tiser hav in g to provide time or space it would rather use fo r o ther claims . For broadcas t adver tising , these cos t s 9 / compliance cos t s can be significan t .-Howeve r , even a se ller who is requi red to inser t a disclosu·re in a "b lank" space in a prin t ad incur s a cost since prior to the disclosure requiremen t , the seller had there is information .
the o ption of using this s pa ce fo r ano ther message . Finally , the cos t of having the d sclo sure displace the provision of o the r This is e specially true for broadcas t since the time fo r the total message is fixed .
When only certain claims are subj ect to dis closure, adverti s ers may avoid the cost of the disclosure by making fewer of these claims . That is, advertis ers may subs titute unregulated claim s, which carry no required dis clos ure, for regulated ones which must contain the dis closure.
For ins tance, when Fires tone was required to dis clo se the definitions of safety in thei r " Safe Tire" campaign they decided to abandon this type of mes sage, thus reducing the in for matio n flow on t he burdened attribute ( Pittle 1976 ) .
Sellers may also shift media as a result of mandatory 4i s closures.
Under current government policies, di s closure requirements tend to fall more heavily on broadcast than on print media.
An advertis ier is typically able to " bury" required in formation in print adverti sing. Required dis closures in audio for radio commer cials and in audio and video for tele vi sion commer cials ( e.g . , under Truth-in-Lending legis lation ) are more likely to occupy a significant portion of commercial time. This may 1 1 For the first six mon th s of 1979 , the average co s t of a prime-time 30
second commer cial on national T . V . was $54, 000 . The marginal cos t of a disc losure in an ad during prime time is likely to be a lower (unknown) figure th an the $1 , 800 per second co s t .
discourage the use of broadcast media thereby shif ting adver tising to les s e ff icient vehicles ( e.g. , magazines o r newspapers ) for reaching certain audienc s egments.
It i s difficult to evalu te the informational trade-offs presented by disc losure s . If a claim alone , without the information i n the disclosure , is so misleading that consumers would be better off with no information about the charac teristic , then dis c losures are c learly appropriate . Since i ron supplements like Geritol are e f fec tive for t irednes s in only l imited s ituations , consumers may be better o f f with no information on thi s char acteristic rather than a mis leading claim that implies tha t the product will rel ieve tiredness for mo st people. On the o ther hand , the informa t ion that a food has "no cholestero l " may be useful to people who are s eek From a Firs t Amendmen t standpoint , remedying mis leading c laims through disclosure ra ther than prohibition at fir s t appears to be a rela tively non res tric t ive approach . For any par ticular c laim, the words are not banned but are s imply supplemented by additional information. Yet disclosure , if burdensome enough , is ac tual ly the func tiona l equivalent of a ban .
In summa ry , there . is an inherent conf lic t be tween avoiding onsumer deception and maximiz ing the flow of truthful speech. A government agency mus t decide whe ther the total information environment would be improved by e i ther eliminating particular mis leading claims or by Restricting requir ing a disc losure which migh t result in reducing informa tion flow.
These alterna tives should be contras ted to the solution of no intervention which woul d result in more informatio n, some of which is deemed to be sligh tly misleading. In some situations , it might be be tter to require disclosure regardless of c laim, and thus avoid the problem of advertisers evading dis closure by changing claims . However , this remedy is more res trictive and may no t be appropriate for all types of deception.
Information Flow
The final c at egory on the Continuum enc ompasses prohibitions on the di s seminati on of informat ion whi ch is j udged as inherently confus ing or decept i ve. Thi s include s restri ct ions on practi ces by a s ingle s eller or for all sellers in a given market . The former involves litigated cas e s , while the latter concern industry wi de rule making e fforts , which have the great est pot enti al both for achi eving benefits and for producing costs.
In general , limitations on speech should only be used as a last resort wh en les s restr i ct ive remedi es are unlikely to correct the market place problem. Prohibit ions have the greatest potent ial for producing untoward s ide e ffects and should, therefore , be used with utmost caut i on .
There are two maj or types of informati on bans : on speci fi c words and for part i cular audiences . Government agencies oc cas ionally attempt t o eliminat e misleading terminology or words from the commercial marketplace.
For example , FTC has proposed restricting "e ffectiveness" claims for over the-counter drug s to those approved by FDA for use on labels ( FTC 1976) .
It has also recommended banning the term "health food" in food advert i s ing on th e grounds that the phrase cannot be de fine d or qualified in any meaningful way ( FTC 1974 ) . The Agency should demonstrat e that no other . less re stric tive approach , such as a standard or disclosure , can be used 1 0 / to accompli sh s imilar results .--Prohibi tions reduce enforcement costs , but they-c an s ub s tantially impede communi cation to consumers and thus res trict marketp lace reactions .
Overal l , government agencies should use informat ion bans primarily to excise demons trably false information from the market . The FTC ' s proposed hearing aid rule , f or e xample , prohibits b latant misrepre sentations ( i . e . , tha t a hearing aid wil l ucure" or " arre s t" hearing los s ) (FTC 1975b ) .
Exc ision o f confus ing or potentially deceptive c laims i s appropriate only when there is c lear and convincing evidence that other remedies will be less e f fec tive .
In addition , vulnerab le consumers such as children , the bereaved , or elderly persons with a hearing los s , may need the extra protec tion aff orded by a prophylactic rule . The s e audiences can be dec lared "off limits" for certain selling methods because of inherent deception or un fairness . For instanc e , the FTC ' s propose d chi ldren ' s adver tising rule suggests as one alternative that any television advertisement aimed at children too young to unders tand selling purpose should be banned b ecause no amount o f dis c losure could remedy this parti cular unfairne s s (FTC 1978 ) . However , extreme caution mus t b e exercised in using these "las t res ort" approaches .
l O / There is apparently no First Amendment imperative for governmen t agenc ies to favor the les s restrictive disclosures versus a ban . The Supreme Court upheld a s tate-imposed ban on trade names for opticians because inherent ly meaningless trade names could dece ive some c onsumers ( Friedman 1979) . This ruling would seem to overrule an opini on by the Third Circuit Court whi ch had advocated that a "leas t restric tive alternative" approach be used --i . e . , that disclosures be preferred to prohibiting deceptive c la ims (Bene ficial Corp . 1977) . The Court ' s defi nition of "reasonab le" deception remedies has not been fully explored , however .
Although no easy answe rs Conc lusions are provided concerning remedy sele ction , this article has argued for application of a few basic principles in the evaluation of any information remedy. It is suggested that the lea s t restric tive remedies should be considered before turning to more restric tive one s. To this end , informa tion remedies have been classified along a con tinuum which runs from the least restric tive to mos t restric tive .
A second basic concept in designing a remedy is the enhancement of benefits and reduc tion of the costs. In general , the b enefit / cos t ratio is increased by selecting remedies which are incent ive c ompat ible and which effec tively c ommunicate informat ion to consumers.
The third maj or theme is that many benefits and costs associated with informa tion regula tion can be identified prior to rule enac tment. Examples were provided to illus trate where information regulation can enhance con sumer choice , improve product quality and lower pri ces.
In an analogous fashion , ins tanc es where information remedies impose significant compliance costs , enforcement costs or costs asso ciated with unint ended s ide effects were discussed. In mos t case s , these costs can be predicted be fore insti tuting a remedy. Prior recognition of these costs might lead policy makers to select a more e ffective approach.
